Chapter III
Endnotes
1 Rad WX 62733 (TS), JCS to MacArthur, 4 Apr 45. In C/S GHQ SWPA, WD 956 (S).
2 Rad WX 63939, Washington to Distr, 6 Apr 45. In C/S GHQ SWPA, WD 959 (S).
3 (1) Rad W 48672 (TS), WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45. In C/S GHQ SWPA, WD 1119 (S).
4 JCS Dir 1380/15, 3 Nov 45 (TS).
5 GHQ SCAP Occupation Instns No. 5, 1 Jan 48.
6 JCS Dir 1380/15, 3 Nov 45, sub: Basic Dir for Post Surr Mil Govt in Japan Proper.
7 USAFPAC Opn Instns No. 4, 29 Nov 45 (Rev) (R), Annex 8, Mil Govt.
8 Rad WCL 32355, Washington to CINCAFPAC ADV, 28 Dec 45.
9 Communique of Moscow Conference, 27 Dec 45.
10 Rad WCL 32355, Washington to CINCAFPAC ADV, 28 Dec 45 ,
11 Other than the foregoing, the Allied Council had no obvious relationship to the Far Eastern Commission. There have been recognizable instances, however, in international press releases, in which the timing of publicity indicated that certain foreign powers simultaneously presented the same subject, agenda, comment or argument in the Council and in the Commission.
12 Rad W 48672 (TS), WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45. In C/S GHQ SWPA, WD 1119 (S).
13 The Sixth US Army occupied the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and the western half of Honshu from 22 September to 31 December 1945, at which time control passed to the Eighth US Army. The Sixth Army was inactivated on 26 January 1946. (8th Info and Hist Sv, Sixth Army Occupation of Japan, 22 Sep-30 Nov 45.)
14 The Japanese Central Liaison Office also maintained a representative in the grade of Chokunin (Minister) in the G-2 Foreign and Japanese Liaison Section. The ever-increasing problems of interpretation and translation were handled by wartime ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Service) which adjusted its operations to meet Occupation conditions.
15 (1) SCAP Staff Memo No. 7, 13 Feb 46; (2) SCAP & USAFPAC Staff Memo No. 56, 10 Dec 46.
16 (1) See Ch. VII ; (2) SCAP Occupation Instns No. 4, 20 Sep 46 (R).
17 GHQ SCAP Cir No. 14, 26 Dec 46, par. 2.
18 Several of the SCAP Civil Sections were headed by officers who remained chiefs of Staff Sections of GHQ AFPAC ; for example, Gen Willoughby was Chief of Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) as well as G-2 for GHQ, SCAP and AFPAC; Brig Gen G.I. Back was Signal Officer of AFPAC as well as Chief of the Civil Communications Section; Gen F.S. Besson was Transportation Officer for AFPAC as well as Chief of the Civil Transportation Section.
19 SCAPIN 436, 13 Dec 45, sub: Regrouping and Consolidation of Occupation Forces in Japan (GC).
20 (1) SCAP Occupation Instns No. 1, 13 Sep 45 (S); ( 2) JCS Dir 1259/27, 11 Dec 46; (3) Rad ZX 29678, CINCAFPAC to CG's Conc, 30 Dec 46; (4) GHQ FEC Cir No. 1, 1 Jan 47.
21 (1) SCAP Occupation Instns No. 3, 12 Feb 46 (R) ; (2) USAFPAC G-3 Opns Rpt No. 1415, 22 Feb-1 Mar 46.
22 (1) SCAP Occupation Instns No. 3, 13 Feb 46; (2) Eighth Army Rad EX 34063 FB, 4 Mar 46. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan; 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 4.)
23 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 3, 12 Feb 46.
25 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 4, 20 Sep 46.
26 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 5, 1 Jan 48.
27 Rad 200157, COM5thFLT to COMNAVJAP, 20 Mar 46. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 5.)
28 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 4, 20 Sep 46.
32 Rpt of the MG Sec, GHQ USAFPAC, 5 Aug-1 Oct 45. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 6.)
33 As a corollary, the 441st CIC, an operating agency of the AC of S, G-2, in his dual role as Chief, CIS, SCAP, deployed immediately into the field detachments, on initial landing in 1945, and maintained a complete coverge throughout Japan in each prefecture.
34 (1) SCAPIN 756, 19 Feb 46, sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction; (2) SCAPIN 853, 25 Mar 46, sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction; (3) SCAPIN 1218, 19 Sep 46, sub: Amendment of Memo on Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction.
35 USAFPAC GO No. 92, 5 Aug 45 (R).
36 USA FM 27-5, par 22, defines the duties assigned to the MG sections of a theater staff.
37 Rpt of the MG Sec, GHQ USAFPAC, 5 Aug-2 Oct 45.
38 USAFPAC Opns Instns No. 4, 28 Aug 45 (S), Annex 8, Mil Govt. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 6.)
39 SWNCC 150/4, 6 Sep 45. Subsequent basic Occupation directives repeated the substance of this provision. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 7.)
40 USAFPAC GO No. 170, 15 Sep 45; No. 183, 22 Sep 45 (R).
41 Rpt of the MG Sec, GHQ USAFPAC, 5 Aug-2 Oct 45 (C). (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 6.)
42 GHQ SCAP GO Nos. 1 and 2, 2 Oct 45.
43 Of which he was Commander in Chief. (SCAPIN 2; Dir No. 2, Office of SCAP, 3 Sep 45.)
44 SCAP Cir No. 14, 26 Dec 46, inclosing organization chart of GHQ SCAP.
45 SCAP GO Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 2 Oct 45.
46 SCAP GO No. 16, 14 Nov 45; No. 20, 8 Dec 45; No. 4, 24 Jan 46; No. 10, 8 Mar 46; No. 18, 18 Apr 46; No. 35, 7 Sep 46.
47 GHQ SCAP GO No. 22, 3 May 46.
48 GHQ SCAP GO No. 34, 29 Aug 46.
49 SCAP sections have no exact counterparts in a normal military staff. Their establishment was caused by conditions peculiar to the Occupation and they played an important part in the outstanding success of the control and rehabilitation of a nation of over 77 million people.
50 When necessary, the General Staff sections of GHQ, AFPAC, furnished administrative, logistic, and service support to SCAP civil staff sections and agencies.
51 SCAP Staff Memo No. 6, 28 Nov 45. (TS) (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 9 . )
53 GHQ SCAP GO No. 20, 26 Apr 46.
54 GHQ SCAP GO No. 20, 8 Dec 45.
55 GHQ SCAP GO No. 21, 9 Dec 45.
56 Note the previous intervention of G-2 Foreign Liaison: September 1945 to March 1946.
57 GHQ SCAP GO No. 18, 18 Apr 46.
58 GHQ SCAP GO No. 3, 2 Oct 45.
59 G-2 maintained a remnant of its wartime Technical Intelligence Teams (5250th Tech Int Co) which worked on numerous projects for ESS.
60 GHQ SCAP GO No. 33, 29 Aug 46.
61 GHQ SCAP GO No. 3, 19 Mar 47.
62 (1) GHQ SCAP GO No. 12, 15 Aug 47; (2) GHQ SCAP Cirs No. 9, 15 Aug 47, and No. 15, 11 Dec 47.
63 GHQ SCAP GO No. 6, 2 Oct 45.
64 See Ch. VIII. In general terms, this section operated in a manner analagous to the American FBI. Adapted to Occupation conditions its activities became important in view of the rise of international communism.
65 GHQ SCAP GO No. 10, 23 Jun 47.
66 GHQ SCAP GO No. 6, 13 Apr 48.
67 GHQ SCAP GO No. 7, 2 Oct 45.
68 GHQ SCAP GO No. 27, 3 Jun 46. G-2 linguist agencies furnished a complete daily coverage of the Japanese press, as an aid to public opinion digests.
69 Through the collateral intervention of CIS in the control and surveillance of ultra-militaristic and subversive elements.
70 GHQ SCAP GO No. 35, 7 Sep 46.
71 GHQ SCAP GO No. 6, 18 Apr 47.
72 GHQ SCAP GO No. 5, 2 Oct 45.
73 GHQ SCAP GO No. 4, 24 Jan 46.
74 GHQ SCAP GO No. 10, 8 Mar 46.
75 GHQ SCAP GO No. 8, 8 May 47.
76 GHQ SCAP GO No. 9, 21 May 47.
77 GHQ SCAP GO No. 5, 13 Apr 48.
78 SCAP instituted a Foreign Liaison Section, under control of G-2, through which communications with diplomatic missions and the Japanese Government were initially handled. ([1] SCAP Staff Memo No. 41, 9 Jun 46, sub: Official Relations and Contacts with the IJG, with Staff Secs of GHQ, and with US Occupational Forces; [2] SCAP Staff Memo No. 49, 27 Jun 46, sub: Channels of Communication with Foreign Govts.)
79 GHQ FEC GO No. 1, 1 Jan 47. The order was in accordance with JCS Dir 1259/27, 11 Dec 46, sub: Unified Command Plan.
80 GHQ, FEC Opns Instns No. 2, 1 Feb 48 (S).
85 (1) JCS Dir 1259/27, 11 Dec 46 (C), sub: Unified Command Plan; (2) Rad WX 87793, Washington to CINCAFPAC, 17 Dec 46.
86 GHQ FEC Opns Instns No. 2, 1 Feb 48 (S). In addition, the FEC was assigned the following missions (a) Discharge of US military responsibilities in the Philippines, under the terms of a Military Assistance Agreement and a Military Bases Agreement negotiated in March 1947. These responsibilities included the roll-up of wartime bases in the Philippines and the disposition of supplies accumulated there for the support of a full-scale offensive against Japan. (b) Maintenance of the security of the FEC, including the protection of sea and air communications. (c) Support of US policy within the scope of CINCFE's command responsibility. This mission involved carrying out the terms of numerous property sale and transfer agreements, the conduct of military government in the Ryukyus, and the conduct of a program of mapping land areas in and adjacent to the FEC, the latter in accordance with international agreements which provided for making such maps available to the Allied governments concerned. However responsibility for civil and military government functions in the Marianas-Bonin-Volcano Islands was specifically excluded from CINCFE's mission and assigned to the Pacific Command under the CinC, Pacific and US Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Command comprised the forces throughout the Pacific other than FEC forces. (d) The conduct of an extensive program of mapping and procurement of terrain intelligence in accordance with international agreements (See "c" above) Field operations covered the establishment of ground control and execution of aerial photography for mapping and charting Japan, Korea, Ryukyus, Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and other areas in the South and Southwest Pacific.
87 JCS Dir 1259/27, 11 Dec 46 (C), sub: Unified Command Plan.
88 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 5, 1 Jan 48.
90 Specific objectives of the Ryukyus Command were: (a) Liquidation of political, social, and economic ties with the Japanese mainland. (b) Restoration of standards of living consistent with those existing prior to the war by: physical restoration of damaged property and facilities; continued improvement of health and sanitation; institution of a sound program of economic development of trade, industry, and agriculture along lines which would insure that the profits and benefits thereof accrued to the native inhabitants and which would assist them in achieving the highest possible level of economic independence; and establishment of an educational program adapted to native capabilities and to local environment.
91 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 2, 1 Feb 48.
92 Under the terms of the Philippine Military Assistance Agreement, signed March 1947, the US, subject to a mutual agreement to be arrived at later, was committed to furnish unspecified military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces, and in the performance of other services which might devolve upon the Republic under its international agreements. It was specified in the Agreement that the US would furnish equipment and technical supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of a Philippine armed force of such strength and composition as might mutually be agreed upon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated a policy as to the general extent to which the US would aid in its development. No clear-cut agreement as to the size of such a force had been reached between the two governments as of the end of December 1948.
Also specified in the Military Assistance Agreement was the establishment of a U. S. Military Advisory Group composed of Army, Navy, and Air officers whose duty it was to assist and advise the Republic on military and naval matters. This Group, known as "USMAG", was set up at Manila and placed under the command of CINCFE. However, since, by the terms of the Agreement, it had to deal through the local State Department officials on all policy matters, and, since the extent of US aid was governed by policies established in Washington, CINCFE could exercise little control over its activities.
93 GHQ FEC Opns Instns No. 2, 1 Feb 48 (S).
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Last updated 11 December 2006 |